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When knowledge is obtained from a database, it is only possible to deduce confidence 
intervals for probability values. With confidence intervals replacing point values, the 
results in the set covering model include interval constraints for the probabilities of 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive explanations. The Principle of Interval Constraints 
ranks these explanations by determining the expected values of the probabilities based on_ 
distributions determined from the interval constraints. This principle was developed using 
the Classical Approach to probability. This paper justifies the Principle of Interval 
Constraints with a more rigorous statement of the Classical Approach and by defending the 
concept· of probabilities of probabilities. -· 
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When knowledge is obtained from a database, one can use simple proportions to I represent probability values. For example, in the STROKE expert system [1] the set 
covering model [21 was used to determine mutually exclusive and exhaustive treatment 
groups, called expfanations, from the diseases. In order to rank the explanations the odds I method was applied to point probability values obtained from a database J3]. However, although it appeared that the independence assumptions in the odds metho , namely that 
diseases are independent in the subspace that a treatment occurs and in the subspace that I it does not\ are valid for this application, the results were poor. When a Weighted Kappa Statistic [4J was used to compare the treatments determined by the expert system with 
those determined by a physician, the correlation was the same as could be expected by I chance. A possible reason for these results is that the use of proportions to represent point values misrepresents the 'knowledge' in the data base. 
For example, suppose the database contained 500 cases. Of those 500 cases, 10 had both I diseases ml and m2. Of those cases, 1 was administered treatment e1 while 9 were 
administered the alternative treatment e2. No other cases had either disease or were 
administered either treatment. If simple proportions are used to determine the point I probabilities, P(ei) and P(eilmi), and the odds method is used to compute the conditional 
probabilities of e1 and e2 given that both ml and m2 occurred, the following values are 
�� . I P(e1lm1,m2)= .86 P(e2lm1,m2) = .99. 
However, for the subpopulation in the database, the values of these conditional 
probabilities are .1 and .9 respectively. These values are so different because the I independence assumptions clearly are not valid in the subpopulation in the database. 
However, since the number of cases administered the first treatment were so small, the 
proportions involving this treatment may not be accurate approximations of the I probabilities for the population at large. Therefore the independence assumptions may still be valid in . the population at large. In this case one should accurately represent the 
knowledge in the database by usin� statistical inference to obtain confidence intervals for 1 the probabilities. Spiegelhalter [5J has noted that it may also be reasonable to obtain confidence intervals from an expert to represent his doubt in point values. 
A method for manipulating confidence intervals using the odds method and the set I 
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covering model is described in [6]. It is straightforward to derive a similar technique for 
manipulating intervals in Reggia and Peng's probabilistic causal set covering model [7]. 
Quinlan [81 has developed a technique which propagates intervals in an inference network. 
However, Speigelhalter [5] has noted that it is only straightforward to propagate intervals 
in causal networks under unrealistic independence assumptions. 
When the technique from [6] is applied in the above example the following intervals are 
obtained: 
P(e1jm1,m2) E (.0005,.9999) P(e2jm1,m2) E (.9780,.9999). 
A data base contains more information about the original probabilities than just 
confidence intervals. For example, it contains the expected values. However, when the 
confidence intervals are manipulated to obtain interval constraints for the probabilities of 
explanations, the only resultant information about the probabilities of these explanations is 
the interval constraints. Therefore the explanations can be ranked based only on the 
information in these constraints. The Principle of Interval Constraints [6] accomplishes 
this by yielding the expected values of the probabilities of mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive sentences based on distributions determined from interval constraints on the 
probabilities. This principle obtains these distributions by applying Laplace's r9] Principle 
of Indifference to the probability values themselves and using the Classical Approach to 
probability. 
The current paper justifies the development of the Principle of Interval Constraints. 
First off, the Classical Approach has been crticized due to its inapplicability in many 
situations and to paradoxes [10,11]. In section 3 of this paper, it is shown that, if the 
Classical Approach is more rigorously stated, these criticisms are eliminated. Others fl2] 
have criticized the notion of probabilities of probabilities. These criticisms are addressed in 
section 4. Before this, in section 2, the development of the Principle of Interval 
Constraints is briefly summarized. 
2. PRINCIPLE OF INTERVAL CONSTRAINTS 
Suppose that we have determined N mutually exclusive and exhaustive sentences, Ei, 
and N confidence intervals, [ai'bi], where 05ai9 and_ 05bi51, such that, if pi is the 
probability of Ei' then pif[ai'bi]. Since the probabilities must sum to one, it is necessary 
that 
· 
N N 
E a. < 1 and 1 < E b . . . 1 1 
- -.. 1 1 1= 1= 
(2.1) 
It is assumed in what follows that these inequalities hold. The following lemma, which 
is proved in [6], yields tighter intervals: 
N 
LEMMA 2.1. If. E pi = 1 and pi E [ai'bi] then for j = 1,2, ... ,N, 1 =1 
Pj � 1 -.� .bi and Pj � 1 -.� .ai" lrJ . lrJ 
Therefore it is possible to obtain tighter intervals by setting, for j = 1,2, ... ,N, 
new b
J
.: min(bJ
., 1 -. � .ai) and new a.: max( a., 1- E b.). 1 r J J J i+j1 
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In what follows it is assumed that the tighter intervals have been computed so that the 
following two inequalities hold for j=1,2, ... ,N: 
b. < 1 - E a. and a. > 1 - E b . . 
J- i:Fj 1 J- i:Fj 1 
(2.2) 
The problem now is to_determjne the expected values of pi from the intervals [ai'bi] 
given that pi e [ai'bi) and the points ai and bi satisfy (2.1) and (2.2). 
Consider first the simple case of three possible events. For a given value x1 E[al'b1], the 
intervals [a.2,b2] and [a3,b3) determine the number of ways that x1 can be the value of pl' 
since if x1is a possible value of pl' there must be some �E[�,b2] and some x3e[a3,b3] such 
that x1 +�+x3=1. H there exist more combinations of points �e[�,b2] and points 
xa4aa,bal such that xi+�+xa=1 than there exist such that x1+x2+xa=1, then, by 
applying the Principle of Indifference to the probability values, we conclude that Xi is a 
more probable value of p1 than is xl. In this way, the interva l s  [a2,b2] and [a3,b3] 
impose a probability density function, J.£1(x1), on the interval [al'b1]. The expected value 
of p1 can be computed from this distribution. 
The above argument extends easily to the case where there are N sentences. The 
theorem for that case follows. First we shall determine the density functions in the case of 
two sentences to illustrate the principles. If there are two possible sentences, inequalities 
(2.2) imply that · 
This implies that if x1 e[al'b1] then 1-x1 e[a2,b2], and p1 can have value x1 in exactly 
one way. Therefore all values in [al'b1] are equal�y probable to be the value of pl' and the 
distribution is uniform. 
Next the concepts outlined above are extended to N sentences. 
THEOREM 2.1. PRINCIPLE OF INTERVAL CONSTRAINTS. Suppose there are N 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive sentences Ei' each with pi=P(Ei), and all that is known 
is that pie[ai'bi) for each i. Then there exist N density functions, �(xi), each defined on 
[ai'bi) and each determining the expected value of pi based on the current information. 
The intervals [aj,b} for j# determine �(xi) by constraining the measure of the ways that, 
for each x. e[a.,b.], there exist x.e[a.,b.l such that x.+ E x.=l. 1 1 1 J J f 1 jfi J 
When N � 2, the function �(xi) and the expected value of pi are obtained from the other 
intervals as follows (i is fixed at 1 to simplify notation): 
1) H N � 3 define 
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!2(x1): max(�, 1-x1-b3-b4-· · ·-bN) 
�(x1) : min(b2, 1-x1-a3-a4-· ··-aN) 
!a(xl'�) : max(a3, 1-x1-�-b4-· · ·-bN) 
i3(xl'�) : min(b3, 1-x1-�
-a4-· ··-aN) 
!N-1 (xr�, ... ,xN-2) = max(aN-1' 1-x1-�-· • ·-xN-2-bN) 
iN-1(x1.�
, ... ,xN-2�: min(bN-1' i-
x1-�-·. ·-xN-2-aN) 
2) pl' the expected value of p1 based on the current information, is given by 
11 � 73 
a1 � !a 
p1 -
-------------------------------------------
Notice that the expected probability is a coordinate for the centroid of a convex region· 
inside an N-1 dimensional unit cube, but that it is a different region for each expected 
probability. 
This theorem is proved in [6]. Some examples follow: 
Example 1. [ai'bi] = [O,b] for i = 1, ... ,N where 1/N � b � 1. 
.. 
Each pi is determined to be 1/
N. 
Example 2. [al'b1] = [.2,.4], [�,b2] = [.3,.4], [a3,b3] = [.3,.5]. 
The following values �e obtained: 
p1 = .2778000, p2 = .3444667, p3 = .3777333. 
The expected probabilities sum to 1 as they should. 
Example 3. [al'b1] = [.0005,.9999], [�,b2] = [.9780,.9995]. 
The following values are obtained_: 
p1 = .0113, p2 = .9887. 
These are the intervals from the example given in the introduction. Now the common 
treatment is ranked much higher than the rare one. 
The Principle of Interval Constraints was· developed by using the Classical Approach to 
probability. In the next section criticisms of this approach are eliminated when the 
approach is stated more rigorously. 
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3. THE CLASSICAL APPROACH 
One of the early developments of the foundations of probability theory was the Classical 
Approach of Laplace [9]. In regards to games of chance, he developed the Principle of 
Indifference which states that, if an experiment is to be performed, and A and B are two 
sentences whose truth values are uniquely determined by the outcome of the experiment, 
and if one's information about the experiment gives one no reason to distinquish the 
occurrence of A from that of B, then . A and B are said to be 'equipossible' and the 
probability of A is equal to the probability of B. In the Classical Approach Laplace used 
this principle to construct probability spaces as follows: 
'The theory of chance consists in reducing all the events of some kind to a certain number of 
cases e(/UaUy possible, that is to say, to such as we may be equally undecided about in regard 
to their existence, and in determining the number of cases favorable to the event whose 
probability is sought. The ratio of this number to that of aU the cases possible is the measure 
of this probability.'[9] · 
It is a simple matter to derive the axioms of probability theory based on this 
construction of a. probability space. Furthermore, this is �he way we commonly assign 
simple probabilities. Regardless, the Principle <;>f Indifference and the Classical Approach 
have become perhaps the most criticized concepts in probability theory; This section 
briefiy reviews these criticisms and shows how a reformulated statement of the Classical 
Approach overcomes some of them. This subject is discussed in more detail in [13]. 
The first criticism is the argument that the Classical Approach has no meaning in many 
standard applications of probability. For example, if one is using the value of .001 to mean 
the probability that a man entering his 39th year will die·in the coming year, there are no 
equipossible alternatives. Von Mises [14] thus defined probability as only having meaning 
in the case of an experiment which can be repeated, and he defined probability as a 
limiting frequence. Based on this definition Von Mises was able to deduce the axioms of 
probability theory. Since the convergence to which Von Mises refers cannot exist in a pure 
mathematical sense, the axioms were later proved assuming convergence only in the sense 
of the weak law of large numbers [15]. 
Many feel that probabilities used to represent personal belief cannot be defined in terms 
of the Principle of Indifference or as limiting frequencies. By defining the probability of a 
Sentence E ending up true as the fraction of a whole unit value which one would feel is the 
fair amount to exchange for the promise that one would receive a whole unit value if E 
turns out to be true and 0 units if E turns out to be false, de Finetti [16] was able to prove 
that, unless the axioms of probability theory are valid, a person wolild have to agree to a 
bet that he is sure to lose. This has been called the Dutch Book Theorem [17]. 
This criticism that the Classical Approach cannot be used in the above situations is 
irrelevant to whether its use is valid in cases where it is possible to it. Few would wait to 
see 1000 cards drawn from a deck before determining the probability of drawing a heart. 
The second criticism is that the Classical Approach is based on logic alone [10]. That is, 
if we expect the probability of an event to approximate the relative frequency with which 
the event will occur in repeated trials, the Classical Approach gives no proof that 
probabilities obtained with this approach will agree with those expectations. Our reason 
just indicates that they should. This criticism is quite valid, and, indeed, if in 10000 draws 
hearts came up 1/2 of the time, most would no longer claim that the probability of a heart 
is still 1/4. However, in practice one must base probability on the available information. 
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In the absence of empirical data, the application of our reason to the information is the 
most we can do. 
The third criticism is that the Principle of Indifference defines probability in a circular 
fashion. That isj sentences are equiprobable becaus
.
e that are equipossible. Many [18] feel 
that Keynes (19 overcame both this criticism and the one based on paradoxes (to be 
discussed next) in his reformulation of the Principle of Indifference. In (13] it is argued 
that Keynes does not accomplish this. Briefly, Keynes was unable to eliminate circular 
reasoning because, in the absence of empirical data, the judgement of equiprobable or 
equipossible alternatives can only be based on our- reason. It cannot be proved. In practice 
our reason determines ·that 'indivisible' alternatives are equipossible. The concept of 
indivisible alternatives is discussed at length in (18] and [19). 
The last criticism is that in the case of paradoxes the Classical Approach leads to 
contradictory results. Since it is well-known, one of Bertrand's geometrical paradoxes will 
be used for illustration. In this paradox, a line is dropped at random on a circle of radius 
on
. 
e. The problem is to determine the probability that the length of the chord produced by 
the line is greater than one. It is a simple matter to show l13] that if the Principle of 
Indifference is applied to a rectangular coordinate a value of /J/2 is obtained for this 
probability, while if it is applied to the angle in polar coordinates a value of 2/3 is 
obtained. It appears that we have different probabilities for the same event depending on 
the coordinate system used. 
To explain why such paradoxes are not antinomies we must first review the relationship 
between probability and information. For example, in the draw of the top card from a 
deck, if one had only the information that the deck were standard the probability of 
drawing the ace of hearts would be 1/52, while if one peaked at the botto� card and had 
the information that it was a king, the probability. of drawing that ace would be 1/51. 
Some argue that some probabilities are metaphysically 'real' while others are due only to 
lack of information.· They claim a coin possesses a 'real' probability of turning up heads 
based on the coin's composition. Others believe in determinism in the universe. They 
maintain that if a 'demon' knew the position and momentum of every particle in the 
universe, he could predict every future event [9]. If one knew the position of the coin in the 
hand, the torque placed on the coin, etc, one would know for certain whether a heads would 
come up. This belief conflicts with the modern theory of quantum mechanics. Some 
physicists [20] are unsatisfied with quantum mechanics for that reason. This issue is 
discussed at length in [18]. Regardless of ones view on this issue, in practice both the 
gambler and the expert must base their probabilities on the available information. 
Next it is shown that, if the Classical Approach is rigorously stated, the information in 
the paradoxes is not sufficient to use this approach. Therefore the paradoxes are not 
antinomies because they are not situations in which the approach should be used. The 
Principle of Indifference states that if the information gives one no reason to choose one 
alternative over the other they should be assigned the same probability. The Classical 
Approach derives probability spaces by applying this principle to a set of mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive sentences. However, this approach violates the Principle of 
Indifference by not requiring that any two sentences, for which the information ·gives one 
no reason to judge one more probable than the other, be assigned the same probabilities in 
the resultant probability space. The contradictions in all the paradoxes arise because, in a 
derived probability space, two such sentences are not assigned the same probability. Let us 
then reformulate the Classical Approach as follows: 
Let an experiment be given and let F be the set of all. sentences whose truth values are 
uniquely determined by the outcome of the experiment. Suppose it is possible to create a 
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probability measure on F such that for every A,B E F, for which the information in the 
experiment gives one no reason to judge either A or B more probable than the other, the 
probability of A is eiJ'Ual to the probability of B. Then the resultant probability space satisfies 
the criteria of the Principle of Indifference. If not, then the information is not sufficient to 
create a probability measure on F based on the Principle of Indifference. 
In practice the distribution is obtained :£rom a set of mutuaily exclusive and exhaustive 
sentences. It does not matter whether these sentences are judged to be eqwprobable or 
whether it is only not possible to judge that one is more probable than the other. We are 
not in quest of metaphysically real probabilities. Rather we seek a method. for determining 
probability values from the available information which are most in accord with our 
·-reason. H we are able to assign equal probabilities to every two sentences, for which the 
information does not imply one is more probable than the other, then we have a probability 
measure which has not assumed any additional information. . On the other hand if we 
create a probability measure which assigns different probabilities to two such sentences 
then we are assuming additional information, namely that their probabilities are not equal. 
H these are the only probability measures that can be created, then the information is not 
sufficient to create a probability measure based on the Principle of Indifference. We will 
now see that-this is the problem in the paradoxes. 
Looking again at Bertrand's Paradox, the statement of the experiment is that the line is 
dropped at 'random'. Since this information. says nothing to differentiate one angle's 
occurrence from another's, it is not possible to judge one angle more probable than another 
and therefore all angles must be given the same probability. When all angles are given 
equal probabilities, larger values of x are assigned larger probabilities than smaller values 
of x. However, since the original information says nothing to differentiate one x value's 
occurrence from another's, this violates the- fact that we'd not judge one value of x to be 
more probable than the other. A similar problem concerning ·angles results when 
rectangular coordinates are used to solve the problem. Since ·all angles can have the same 
probability only if all x coordinates do not,_ it is not possible to create a probability 
measure based on the Principal of Indifference. -
Therefore the Classical Approach cannot be used in this problem. There is nothing 
contradictory about this. As Keynes [19] said, the Classical Approach cannot be used on 
every body of information. For example, suppose the information is that an urn contains 
one white ball and the remaining balls are black, and we wish to compute the probability of 
drawing a black ball. No one would deem this information sufficient to apply the Classical 
Approach. However, the reason it is insufficient is because of the condition in the 
reformulated Classical Approach. Based on the information, there is no reason to judge 
that a given number of black balls is more probable than any other number. However, it is 
not possible to create a probability measure in which the sentence 'the bin contains n black 
balls' has the same probability for every n. 
It may seem that the Classical Approach was reformulated just to eliminate the 
paradoxes, but that was not the case. We have reformulated the Classical Approach to 
bring the application of the Principle of Indifference in this approach in line with our 
reason. To see this we shall analyze Bertrand's paradox further. If the information were 
more precise it would be possible to use the Classical Approach. For example, if the 
information were that the hand is randomly moving to the left or right, then the solution 
using rectangular coordinates would be correct. As the problem was stated, we can only 
conclude that the hand is moving in a totally random fashion. However, the movement of 
a hand in a random fashion is not a well defined concept. It makes sense that such 
information is not sufficient to determine a probability measure. 
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The purpose of this section has not been to return the Classical Approach to its status of 
the 18th century. Rather it has been to show that, in the absence of empirical information, 
a cautious application of this approach yields probability values which agree with our 
reason. 
Since the Principle of Interval Constraints was based on an application of the 
reformulated Classical Approach, the development of this principle contains no 
contradictions. There remains, however, the question of whether it makes sense to assign 
probabilities to probability values. 
4. PROBABILITIES OF PROBABILITIES 
Pearl [12] states that 'traditional probability theory insists that proba_bilities be assigned 
strictly .... to sentences whose truth values can, at least in principle be verified 
unequivocally by emperical test .... The truth of probabilistic statements about any specific 
event cannot be ascertained nor falsified emperically; once we observe the uncertain event1 
the probability becomes either one or zero'. Pearl thus concludes that it makes no sense to 
discuss probabilities of probabilities. 
This problem is resolved by distinguishing the experiment which determines the 
probability value from the experiment which uses the probability value. Consider the 
following example: Create a large set of urns such that possible proportions of type A and 
B items are equally represented· in the set. The act of selecting an urn is the experiment 
which determines a probability value while the act of picking an item from that urn is the 
experiment which uses that probability value. Pearl does acknowledge such two-level 
lottery processes. He dismisses them by arguing that the betting behavior of a rational 
agent believing in such a process cannot be distinquished from that of an agent believing in 
�equivalent single-level model. His argument, however, does not invalidate the example. 
The example shows that the outcome of an experiment can determine a probability value. · 
Continuing the example with the urns further, now set the compositions of the urns so 
that the proportions of type A items and type B items are uniformly distributed in [0,.51 
and [.5,1] respectively. Next randomly pick a large number of urns. If n is the number of 
urns picked and pi is the actual proportion of type A items in the ith urn picked, then .25 
is the expected value of each pi. The strong law of large numbers therefore implies that, 
with probability 1, 
. P1+P2+· · ·+Pn hm n = .25 , n-tm 
and it is 'almost certain' that the proportion of type A items in all the urns collectively can 
be made arbitrarily close to .25 by taking n sufficiently large. Therefore if a large number 
of items are drawn from each urn picked, the strong law of large numbers again implies 
that it is 'almost certain' that the proportion of type A items drawn is close to .25. Thus, 
if when each item is drawn, we bet in accordance with the expected value obtained using 
the Principle of Interval Constraints, we should approximately break even in the long run. 
Such an example is a bit contrived. Another example illustrates where the probability 
values are distributed in nature. Suppose two individuals race and we have no information 
as to their relative speeds. The constraints on the probability of one individual winning are 
that the probability is a value in the interval [0,1] and that there are exactly two 
alternatives. Choosing those two individuals is the experiment which uniquely determines 
that probability. It may not be possible to compute this probability exactly. However1 by 
using probability theory in this situation, one is hypothesizing that there is a probability 
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value associated with certain information about the individuals. In principle then a demon 
could know it, and one could determine the value exactly by consulting the demon. In 
practice one can closely approximate the value by observing them race many times and 
using statistical inference. To· obtain another probability value subject to these same 
constraints one must pick two other individuals to race, toss a coin about which one has no 
information as to the probability of heads, or pick any other event with two possible 
outcomes and no other information. The Principle of Interval Constraints hypothesizes 
that the probabilities in these experiments are distributed in nature according to the 
Principle of Indifference. If this .hypothesis is correct, the example with the urns shows 
that the most rational betting behavior is to bet according to the expected values 
determined by the Principle of Interval Constraints. 
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